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I am delighted to see intentionality receive the attention it deserves from the dis-
tinguished group of developmentalists who have contributed to the volume Develop-
ing Theories o f  Intention. The model of language acquisition I have proposed takes 
infant intentionality as its starting point and locates language in the broader context 
of development [e.g., Bloom, 1993, 1998; Bloom & Beckwith, 1986; Bloom & Tinker, 
2000]. With this model, I have explored the expression of intentionality from several 
perspectives. First, using a wide lens, I have studied coextensive developments in lan-
guage, affect, cognition, and social interaction that extend over time, through several 
developmental transitions in language from 9 months of age to the third year. Sec-
ond, using a very narrow lens, I have studied the microgenetic unfolding and integra-
tion of expressive actions in language, affect, play, and conversation as these behav-
iors occur from moment to moment in real time. A recurring theme in the results of 
all these studies is the authority o f  the child in the developmental process. What a 
child has in mind - the child's intentional state at any particular moment of time -
determines the child's actions and interactions in the world and, hence, the child's 
development. 
Because each chapter in Zelazo, Astington, and Olson's book takes a different 
approach to answering the questions: What is intentionality? and How does intentional-
ity influence development?, all of the chapters, taken together, present a very broad and, 
indeed, a very rich account. The principal attraction of the book is in this very richness, 
with its diversity in focus and interpretation. The book is the result of a conference at 
the University of Toronto in 1997. The antecedent to that conference and, consequent-
ly, to this book, was the earlier conference on Developing Theories of Mind, in 1986, 
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that created the surge of interest in theory-of-mind research in the ensuing decade. In a 
very real sense this book represents a 'coming of age', as theory of mind has embraced 
the concept of intentionality and its implications for developmental theory and re-
search. Many of the contributors to this volume also participated in the earlier confer-
ence on understanding the mind. Other contributors, who were not at the original con-
ference, bring perspectives from research disciplines concerned with different develop-
mental issues, such as language, social, and emotional development. Indeed, develop-
mentalists have discovered that intentionality is at the very heart of such seemingly 
diverse things as imitation, goal-directed behavior, emotionality, executive function, 
and, indeed, language acquisition. 
The richness of the volume also contributes to a certain diffuseness and a sense of 
separateness among the different chapters that is, perhaps, inevitable in any edited vol-
ume. However, the diffuseness and lack of cohesion in the book also come from a 
certain ambiguity in some of the chapters about just what intentionality is. Three inten-
tionality concepts surface throughout the book: ( 1) intentionality in the larger sense of 
the directedness and 'aboutness' of contents of mind - what the immediate, moment-
to-moment representations in consciousness are 'about', or what an experience is an 
experience 'of'; (2) intentionality in the narrower sense of the goal-directedness of indi-
vidual actions; and (3) the intuitive, psychological theories we have about intentionality 
and intentional action that influence our everyday actions and interactions - what has 
come to be called theory of  mind. Several chapters recognized and laid out the distinc-
tions among the three concepts of intentionality and their history in the philosophy of 
thought and language, notably the introduction to the volume by its editors, Olson, 
Astington, and Zelazo, and the chapters by Astington, and by Meltzoff, Gopnik, and 
Repacholi. Others acknowledge intentionality in its larger sense, but then proceed to 
focus on the narrow sense of intentional action, or to confuse the three senses in which 
the term might be used. 
The distinction between the larger sense of intentionality and the goal-directedness 
of intentional action has been characterized in different ways, but John Searle's formu-
lation is perhaps the most direct. Intentionality in the larger sense, with a capital T ,  
comprises Intentional states - representations of elements, roles, and relations set up in 
conscious states of mind, under the psychological attitudes of belief, desire, and feeling 
that we have toward them. Intentional states may include but are not limited to goal-
directed action, which is intention with a small "i' - an intention to do something, to act, 
to communicate - what Searle called only the 'ordinary' sense of the term intention, 
'just one form of Intentionality along with belief, hope, fear, desire, and lots of others' 
[ 1983, p. 3]. This goal-directedness or intention in the ordinary sense is just one part of 
what an infant, for example, has in mind when reaching for a toy. The reach is intended 
by the infant and directed toward a goal. But the infant's intentional state also includes, 
along with a representation of the toy and the desire to have it, representations of feel-
ings about having or not having it. beliefs about what the object is and what might be 
done with it, awareness of whether another person might help to achieve it, perhaps a 
plan for doing something with it once it is achieved, and so on. 
The third sense of intentionality, theory of mind, is the one best represented in the 
book. It is, however, by and large a theory of the other mind: how children learn to 
attribute or 'ascribe' intentional states to other persons; how a child comes to under-
stand the intentionality of other persons and the sources of others' intentional actions; 
or how other persons can influence the child's thoughts and, hence, the child's actions. 





Several of the authors, in fact, causally attribute certain developmental milestones, such 
as the first words, to the child's ability to read another person's intentions. This empha-
sis on other minds is consistent with the theme articulated in the book's subtitle 'Social 
Understanding and Self-Control'. To be sure, in a very profound sense, our everyday 
interactions in the world depend on what we can attribute to what other people might 
have in mind. Much of what we do when we talk and when we act is influenced by what 
we think other people know and are thinking about, and how we, in tum, might 
influence what others know and might think. 
However, with the notable exception of the chapters by Meltzoff, Gopnik, and 
Repacholi; Olson and Kamawar; and Astington, little attention is given to the first per-
son perspective of the child's own intentionality - the developments that are required 
for increasing complexity and abstractness of the child's intentional state representa-
tions and, in turn, the effects of such changes in the child's contents of mind on develop-
ment. The child's questions, as opposed to the researcher's questions, are What do I 
have in mind?, and How docs what I have in mind influence what I do and how I feel 
and what others might do or not do, feel or not feel? The powerful influence from the 
child's own intentionality on the actions of other persons and, indeed, on the child's 
development even more generally receive less attention than what the child might or 
might not be able to attribute to the intentions of others. My comments here have two 
themes: one is the overriding importance of the larger sense of intentionality and the 
other is the relationship between intentionality and dei·elopment. 
Intentionality Writ Large 
Intentionality is that aspect of mind that intervenes between what we perceive in 
the outer world at any one moment in time and the inner knowledge of the world we 
have in memory all of the time. A theory of intentionality is a theory of consciousness. 
Intentional states arc representations, and they are dynamically constructed from 
moment to moment in that part of the mind ordinarily referred to as consciousness, as 
prior knowledge informs perceptions, actions, and interactions. These representations 
include elements, with their roles and the relationships between them, in events that 
refer to one's understanding of like items in the real world. Intentional states are the 
result of cognitive activity and affective engagement in a world of persons, objects, and 
events, and neither language, theory of mind, nor any other product of development can 
happen without them [Bloom, 1993, 1998; Bloom & Tinker, 2000]. 
Because the mental phenomena of intentional states are hidden, other persons can-
not know them until they are made manifest, in an embodiment [Danto, 1973, 1983; 
Taylor, 1979, 1985]. Language is provided by society for making the internal, personal, 
private intentional states of individuals external and public, in an expression, so that 
they can be shared with other persons. But it is not only language that can do this. 
Emotional displays, gestures, and other actions can also be expressions - in the sense of 
an embodiment - of contents of mind. The attribution from one individual to another 
of what each has in mind is, arguably, at the heart of a theory of mind, and attribution 
depends on expression and interpretation. In particular, expression and interpretation 
are required for sharing contents of mind, when what one individual has in mind is 
different from what another has in mind. I have suggested this principle ofdiscrepancy to 
explain why a language is acquired [Bloom, 1993]. A language has to be acquired when 
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contents of mind differ from things already evident in the here-and-now, and other 
persons cannot exploit cues from the context for shared understanding. The principle is 
obviously social, because a language is acquired to resolve discrepancy between minds. 
But the principle of discrepancy is also fundamentally cognitive, because it is about 
representations and changes in representations that the child constructs for both inter-
pretation and expression. The principle of discrepancy would appear to apply as well to 
acquiring a theory of mind. 
Intentionality and Development 
The influences on all of a child's development originate with representations in 
intentional states. and these are constantly changing: changing in immediate time, as a 
function of the child's actions and interpretation of the actions of others, and changing 
over extended time as a function of development. Intentionality, itself, does not develop 
over time. Rather, developmental changes occur in possible contents of mind as a func-
tion of developments in, at least, cognition, language. emotionality, and social con-
nectedness. Thus, the child's theory of mind cannot be separated from its larger devel-
opmental context: the affective, social, cognitive, and linguistic processes that influence 
each other, from the start, to determine how the child comes to think about the world 
and about the mind. 
The social contacts between the child and other persons are critical for all develop-
ment: A child's connectedness and intersubjectivity with other persons sustain the 
child's commitment to the world for development and learning. Much attention 
throughout the book is given to how other persons influence what the child has in mind. 
But the child's actions have no less of an effect on the adult mind. In fact, more often 
than not. how an adult interprets a child's behaviors determines just how an adult acts 
to influence the child"s behaviors. Evidence is accumulating to show that it is responsive-
ness to a child by a caregiver that determines the interaction between them, rather than 
the adult's direction or prior 'scaffolding' of the interaction [Bloom, 199 3, 1998; Bloom, 
Margulis, Tinker, & Fujita, 1996; Bloom & Tinker, 2000; Howe, 1981; Roth, 1987]. The 
routines, games. and formatting (the prototypical kinds of scaffolding events) that 
mothers set up in exchanges with their infants are prompted most often by something 
the child looks at, touches, or says [Maher, Lucariello, & Bloom, 1999]. And the extent 
to which caregiver speech is responsive is a much stronger predictor of word learning 
than is the mere quantity or amount of speech a child hears [Bornstein, Tamis-LeMon-
da, & Haynes, 1999]. 
Social connectedness does not occur without the affective component of develop-
ment: a child's attention, engagement, and emotionality that determine the relevance of 
events and the directedness of a child's interactions in the world - what I have called the 
principle of relevance: Development is enhanced when events in the context are rele-
vant, when they are pertinent to what a child has in mind [Bloom, 1993, 1998]. The part 
played by affect in children's development is rarely given the attention it deserves. The 
chapter by Olson and Kamawar, describing the critical part played by feelings in the 
emergence of a theory of mind, is a notable exception. They point out that 'ascribing' or 
attributing contents of mind begins with interpreting feelings. In fact, all of social devel-
opment has its origins in the intersubjectivity between infant and child that depends on 
sharing feeling states [sec, for example, Stern, 1977, 1985]. The chapter by Dunn em-
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